This paper investigates the e¤ ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions and foreclosure laws on mortgage default and foreclosure rates across di¤ erent segments of the mortgage market using state-level data. The empirical model improves on previous models by addressing the bias from omitted debt portfolio variable, and recognizing that credit term variables included in existing models are not econometrically exogenous in explaining default and possible foreclosure. We …nd that high bankruptcy homestead exemptions, judicial foreclosure, and prohibition of de…ciency judgments are associated with greater default and foreclosure rates and have a small negative e¤ ect on the fraction of serious delinquencies that lead to foreclosure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although legally a loan is in default when a scheduled monthly payment is unpaid for 30 days, in practice industry views default as occurring when an a loan is 90 days past due (three missed payments and a fourth payment is due). Foreclosure is the legal process that a mortgage lender initiates to take possession of the property of a defaulting borrower. Foreclosure is not the only course of action a lender may take in the event of default, and many mortgages in default eventually become current regardless of whether or not a foreclosure has been initiated (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 1996).
The economic literature has convincingly demonstrated that legal framework has an important in ‡uence on the payment behavior of borrowers and lenders in credit markets. 1 Much of the legal framework governing credit in the United States is provided by the states, and federal laws often overlie state laws. This situation exists for laws governing default and foreclosure in mortgage markets. State foreclosure laws in ‡uence decisions to default on mortgage loans and resolve defaults by foreclosure. Each state has a unique set of foreclosure laws. Federal bankruptcy law supersedes state law provisions regarding lenders' rights to foreclose. Filing for bankruptcy invokes an automatic stay on lender e¤orts to collect on debts, thereby delaying or stopping a mortgage lender's acquisition of the property of a defaulting borrower. A lender may request a release from a stay, and the court may honour the request. However, a borrower's decision to …le for bankruptcy introduces uncertainty, creates delays, and causes additional costs in the foreclosure process. Bankruptcy homestead and personal property exemptions preserve a part of the borrower's home equity and other assets after bankruptcy, thereby in ‡uencing the borrower's incentive to …le for bankruptcy.
The exemption levels are set by the states and vary widely; but federal exemption levels also exist, and a borrower may choose federal exemption levels, unless the state in which the borrower resides has opted out of the federal system.
Studies investigating determinants of mortgage default and foreclosure have considered e¤ects of state foreclosure laws but not borrowers'incentives to …le for bankruptcy to delay foreclosure. Evidence is available on the e¤ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions on availability of secured credit. This evidence is inconsistent and only partially accounts for di¤erences in foreclosure laws. No evidence exists on bankruptcy asset exemptions'e¤ects on mortgage default and foreclosure rates.
This paper contributes to the literature, by examining the e¤ects of both foreclosure laws and bankruptcy asset exemptions on defaults and foreclosures. The paper brings several improvements relative to previous studies. First, it recognizes that the e¤ects may di¤er in di¤erent market segments, and therefore considers separately …xed and adjustable-rate mortgages in prime and subprime markets. Adjustable-rate mortgages are more attractive to higher risk credit constrained borrowers because monthly payments are initially lower than those for …xed-rate mortgages (Coulibaly and Li 2007) . Credit constrained borrowers using adjustable-rate mortgages are vulnerable to increases in interest rates and events that reduce their discretionary income. As a consequence, serious delinquencies tend to be greater for adjustable-rate mortgages than …xed-rate mortgages (chart 1). The e¤ects of bankruptcy exemptions may di¤er in prime and subprime market segments, as subprime borrowers had on average lower levels of home equity to protect through bankruptcy (Gorton 2008 ).
Second, it points to the importance of relative holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage debt (debt portfolio) in explaining mortgage default. Theoretical model developed in that paper predicts that there is a non-linear relationship between bankruptcy asset exemptions, debt portfolio, and the mortgage defaults. A marginal increase in bankruptcy asset exemptions changes borrower's optimal debt portfolio, which, in turn a¤ects her decision to default on mortgage debt. The empirical model used for this paper addresses the bias from omitted debt portfolio, and our results support the prediction of the theoretical model.
Third, the empirical model also improves on previous models by recognizing that borrowers consider the risk of default in choosing credit terms. When borrowers choose to …nance a larger percentage of house value at a higher interest rate, they are aware that the higher debt service burden and smaller equity stake in the house a¤ects their ability and willingness to repay the mortgage. Thus, the loan-to-value ratio and interest rate are not econometrically exogenous in explaining default and possible foreclosure. More complete speci…cation and the improvement in econometric methods therefore provides more reliable evidence on the e¤ects of foreclosure laws and bankruptcy asset exemptions in mortgage markets.
Our preliminary …ndings indicate that judicial foreclosure, prohibition of de…ciency judgments, and high bankruptcy homestead exemptions are associated with greater default and foreclosure rates and have a small negative e¤ect on the fraction of serious delinquencies that lead to foreclosure. These results suggest that lenders in default friendly states may seek to resolve default outside of foreclosure in order to avoid pushing borrowers seek relief by …ling for bankruptcy. Higher personal property exemptions are generally inversely related to serious delinquencies and foreclosures. And for prime mortgages higher personal property exemptions are associated with lower share of foreclosure starts as a fraction of serious delinquencies. The last …nding tends to support Berkowitz and Hynes'(1999) hypothesis that by discharging non-mortgage debts, personal property exemptions may help borrowers make payments on secured debts and avoid foreclosure, at least in the prime mortgage market.
II. STATE FORECLOSURE AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS'EFFECTS IN MORTGAGE MARKETS
Legal rules may a¤ect default risk by creating transaction costs, which may in ‡uence borrowers' and lenders incentives' to default. Mulherin and Muller (1987) examined incentives to default in mortgages in which the lender purchases default insurance from an insurer. This practice is typical in risky mortgage transactions involving high loan amounts relative to home value. 2 Their theoretical model showed that default insurance causes incentives of borrowers, lenders, and mortgage insurers to diverge. Speci…cally, they demonstrated that if the contract rate for the mortgage is less than the current market rate, the lender is better o¤ when the borrower defaults rather than makes the payment. That insurers do not cover the entire principal reduces the lender's gain from default. Transaction costs may further reduce the lender bene…ts to default and provide borrowers an incentive to pay. However, under certain circumstances-belowmarket …nancing arrangements or rising interest rates combined with falling house prices, for exampleinsurance may stimulate lender induced defaults and foreclosures. 3 Among the transaction costs that may in ‡uence borrowers'and lenders'incentives to default are state laws governing foreclosures and the amount of borrowers'housing and personal assets that are protected in bankruptcy.
A few empirical studies have examined e¤ects of state foreclosure laws on mortgage default (Clauretie 1987 ; borrowers from the market thereby reducing defaults, but more lenient bankruptcy asset exemptions may make lead to greater defaults because default is less costly. The issue of bankruptcy asset exemptions'e¤ects on foreclosure rates remains unresolved (White 2005) . The remainder of this section discusses these studies in greater detail.
A. Foreclosure Laws
Two types of foreclosure procedures are used in the US: judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. In a judicial foreclosure, a court orders the foreclosure and supervises the sale and disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of the collateral. In a non-judicial foreclosure, the lender noti…es the borrower of its intent to foreclose and appoints an independent party (attorney, foreclosure service, or trustee) to arrange the sale. 4 Judicial foreclosures are available in all states, but some states allow only judicial foreclosures.
Because of their greater complexity, judicial foreclosures are generally more costly and time consuming than non-judicial foreclosures. Crew- Cutts and Merrill (2008) reported that in Freddie Mac's experience the average time from the time a mortgage is sent to an attorney to begin the process of foreclosure to …nalized foreclosure sale and possession is 272 days in states that require judicial foreclosure and 149 days in states that allow non-judicial foreclosures. They also reported that foreclosure costs are greater the in states that require judicial foreclosures than states that allow non-judicial foreclosures.
Statutory right of redemption and de…ciency judgement are other signi…cant provisions of foreclosure laws in some states. A statutory right of redemption allows a borrower to purchase the foreclosed property at the foreclosure sale price plus accrued interest during a speci…ed period of time after the foreclosure sale. This right may lower bids at foreclosure sales as it delays the buyer from obtaining a clear title. A de…ciency judgement allows a lender to recover against the borrower's personal assets if the proceeds from the foreclosure sale are not su¢ cient to repay the loan.
As mentioned, a few empirical studies of state foreclosure laws are available. Noting then recent mortgage default studies investigating borrowers'default option, Clauretie (1987) and Aalberts and Clauretie (1988) pointed out that default and foreclosure is not the only option available a borrower and the lender when a mortgage becomes seriously delinquent. They may renegotiate the loan, or the borrower may re…nance or sell the house and perhaps salvage any equity that remains. 5 Whether or not a foreclosure occurs depends on borrowers and lenders costs and bene…ts of foreclosure relative to these other options.
The costs and bene…ts of foreclosure depend on loan to value, the contract interest rate relative to the current market rate (as shown by Mulherin and Muller 1987), property price appreciation, and available legal remedies to default. In their empirical analyses of foreclosure rates based on this model, Clauretie (1987) and Aalberts and Clauretie (1988) considered state laws allowing power-of-sale foreclosure (that is, not requiring judicial foreclosure) and de…ciency judgements; length of any statutory redemption period; and the average length of the foreclosure period. 6 Data on foreclosure rates were from the Mortgage Bankers Association (both studies) and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (Clauretie 1987) . They used ordinary least squares for estimation. The model included the change in unemployment (lagged two periods) and change in divorce rate (lagged one period) as factors that may trigger defaults. They used changes in unemployment and divorce rates, arguing that variability had a greater e¤ect on defaults than levels, and lagged values of changes because it takes time for changes to work through to default. As borrowers likely are aware that the higher debt service burden associated with the contract interest rate and the smaller equity stake in the house a¤ects their ability and willingness to repay the mortgage, the contract interest rate and loan to value are endogenous, making ordinary least squares estimates of these parameters biased.
Results of estimation were similar in both studies and indicated that legal remedies signi…cantly a¤ected foreclosure rates. 7 For conventional mortgages, availability of power-of-sale foreclosures was associated with higher rates of foreclosure, and average length of foreclosure period and length of statutory redemption 5 Also see US Department of Housing and Urban Development (1996) or Wallace (2007) . Wallace noted further that some borrowers take such actions to cure defaults after the lender has …led for foreclosure and the foreclosure is pending. 6 See Jones (1993) for an analysis of de…ciency judgements and mortgage default. 7 Coe¢ cients are considered statistically signi…cant in this review if their level of signi…cance is 10 percent or less.
period were associated with lower foreclosure rates. They obtained the opposite e¤ects for FHA and VA mortgages. That is, power-of-sale foreclosures was associated with lower rates of foreclosure, and average length of foreclosure period and length of statutory redemption period were associated with higher foreclosure rates. They attributed the …nding that foreclosures of government-insured loans were higher in states with larger foreclosure costs to adverse selection. In high-foreclosure cost states, lenders channel risky borrowers to government-insured mortgages, which limit or compensate for those costs. Availability of de…ciency judgement was positively related to the foreclosure rate for both conventional and government-insured loans but was not statistically signi…cant. 8 Clauretie and Herzog (1990) examined insurance default loss rate for private and government-insured mortgages using a model similar to that in Clauretie (1987) . For both types of loans, insurance loss rates were signi…cantly lower in states where power-of-sale foreclosures were available and higher in states with a statutory right of redemption. Availability of de…ciency judgement was associated with statistically signi…cantly lower loss rates for privately insured mortgage but not for government-insured mortgages. These …ndings support the hypothesis that state laws a¤ect foreclosure costs and thereby in ‡uence default loss rates. That power-of sale (statutory right of redemption) is associated with lower (greater) foreclosure rates but higher default loss rates for government-insured mortgages is consistent with Clauretie's suggestion that lenders channel high-risk mortgages to government-insured programs in states with high foreclosure costs.
Pennington-Cross (2008) examined the e¤ects of required judicial foreclosure and statutory right of redemption on the duration of subprime mortgage foreclosures (that is, the time from foreclosure start to exit through cure, partial cure, transfer of property to the lender, or pay o¤). Explanatory variables included loan to value, FICO score, savings if the mortgage were re…nanced at current market rate, the unemployment rate, length of pre-foreclosure delinquencies, outstanding mortgage balance, and required judicial foreclosure, and statutory right of redemption. Results of estimation indicated that loans in states that states that do not require judicial foreclosure exited foreclosure signi…cantly earlier through all options (cure, partial cure, transfer of property to the lender, or pay o¤) earlier than loans in states that require judicial foreclosure. A 8 The current mortgage rate relative to the rate …ve years earlier, which re ‡ects the di¤erence between contract and current mortgage rates, was statistically signi…cant and positive for both conventional and government-insured loans, consistent with Mulherin and Muller's (1987) prediction that lenders' have an incentive to foreclose when the current market rate is greater than the contract rate. Increases in house prices were signi…cantly negatively related to foreclosure rates. For both types of loans, changes in unemployment and divorce rates had positive coe¢ cients but were not statistically signi…cant. statutory right of redemption was not signi…cantly related to the duration of foreclosures, however.
B. Bankruptcy Asset Exemptions
Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) found that larger bankruptcy asset exemptions reduce availability of credit generally. This …nding stimulated further research investigating whether or not bankruptcy asset exemptions have similar e¤ects on secured and unsecured credit. Mortgages, like other forms of secured credit, di¤er from unsecured credit in bankruptcy. If the borrower defaults on a mortgage, the lender has the right to foreclose on the house. The proceeds of selling the house go …rst to repay the mortgage. After repaying the mortgage, the borrower retains any surplus up to the amount of the homestead exemption.
Because the secured lender must be repaid in full before the borrower bene…ts from the exemption, the amount of the exemption provides the borrower no incentive to default on the mortgage (Berkowitz and Hynes 1999).
The amount of the exemption does in ‡uence the decision to …le for bankruptcy, however. Filing for bankruptcy is more attractive in when homestead and personal property exemptions are higher, and …ling for bankruptcy likely a¤ects foreclosure. Defaulting mortgage borrowers typically …le for Chapter 13 bankruptcy (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 1996). The bankruptcy …ling temporarily stops foreclosure proceedings. The lender may request a release from the stay on processing the foreclosure. Such requests are usually granted when the value of the house is less than the amount of mortgage debt. Even when the lender's request is granted, the bankruptcy …ling delays foreclosure and causes the lender to incur additional legal costs. Thus, higher asset exemptions may induce more borrowers seeking to delay foreclosure to …le for bankruptcy (Lin and White 2001) . 9 And the delay and additional legal costs may make lenders less willing to make higher risk loans. Whether the delay and additional legal costs would cause lenders to start foreclosure proceedings earlier or make them more willing to pursue solutions to serious delinquency outside of foreclosure when asset exemptions are higher is unclear. 10 Bankruptcy asset exemptions may 9 For evidence that higher exemption levels are associated with higher bankruptcy …ling rates, see Agarwal, Liu, and Mielnicki (2003).
1 0 Crew-Cutts and Merrill (2008) noted that lenders foreclosure costs are higher the longer the length of the foreclosure period. This consideration suggests that lenders ought to initial foreclosure promptly to avoid higher costs of delay. However, limited evidence suggests that the prospect of delay and higher cost might initially cause lenders to attempt non-foreclosure solutions to default. Examining data on foreclosed conventional and VA mortgages, Springer and Waller (1993) found that mortgages owed by borrowers who …led for bankruptcy remained delinquent for a longer period of time prior to starting foreclosure than mortgages where bankruptcy was not involved. a¤ect secured lenders in other ways as well. When the sale of the house is insu¢ cient to repay mortgage fully, the mortgage lender has an unsecured claim for the unpaid portion of the loan. The amount of the personal property exemption adversely a¤ects the value of this claim. Thus, relatively high loan-to-value mortgages would be riskier in states with higher personal property exemption levels. In other cases, higher asset exemption values may make secured lending less risky. Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) suggested that while higher amounts of asset exemptions may induce borrowers to …le for bankruptcy, higher asset exemptions leave them with more wealth after bankruptcy, which may in turn help them continue to repay secured debts after bankruptcy.
Existing evidence on e¤ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions concerns mortgage denials and loan amount and is based largely on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) found a small though statistically signi…cant negative e¤ect for the amount of the homestead exemption on the probability of denial. This …nding, they argued, supports the prediction of their theoretical model that a small wealth e¤ect from a higher exemption helps borrowers repay their mortgages and thereby reduces the risk of mortgage lending.
The amount of the personal property exemption was not statistically signi…cantly related to the probability of denial. In addition, regressions using state-level data from the Federal Housing Finance Board indicated that neither the amount of the homestead exemption nor the amount of the personal property exemption had a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the average mortgage interest rate or the average loan-tovalue ratio. Berkowitz and Hynes interpreted these results consistent with their hypotheses that the amount of bankruptcy asset exemptions should not a¤ect the supply of secured credit.
Lin and White's (2001) model predicted that a higher homestead or higher personal property exemption would increase the likelihood of mortgage default if delay costs in bankruptcy are positive, which is usually the case. This prediction holds even when bankruptcy discharges the unsecured debt and borrower uses the entire increase in wealth to pay the mortgage. Lin and White (2001) estimated separate models for denials of home purchase and home improvement loans. Home improvement loans are of interest because they rank below …rst mortgages in priority or are unsecured. Home improvement lenders therefore rely more heavily on borrowers'non-housing wealth for repayment of the loan. 11 Bankruptcy asset exemptions likely would have a greater e¤ect on home improvement loans than home purchase loans.
Results of estimation indicated that higher asset exemptions were generally associated with greater probability of loan denial. For home purchase loans, an unlimited homestead exemption and amount of personal property exemptions were statistically signi…cant and positive. For home improvement loans, $30,000-400,000
and unlimited homestead exemptions were statistically signi…cant and positive. The amount of the personal property exemption was positive, but not statistically signi…cant. 12 Consistent with expectations, the e¤ect of the homestead exemption was greater for home improvement loans than home purchase loans. Applicants for home improvement loans were …ve percentage points more likely to be turned down in states with an unlimited homestead exemption. Applicants for home purchase loans were two percentage points more likely to be turned down. Lin and White also found that availability of de…ciency judgement was associated with lower probability of denial, although the coe¢ cient was small and not signi…cant for home improvement loans.
Identifying a likely cause for di¤erences in …ndings of Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White relationship between default and bankruptcy asset exemptions can be explained by a failure to account for borrowers' creditworthiness. They argued that creditworthiness, as measured by a credit bureau risk score, is correlated with levels of bankruptcy asset exemptions. Higher exemption levels are associated with higher default rates and therefore lower credit scores. They found that exemptions were not statistically signi…cantly related to mortgage denials or loan size when average credit risk score was included in the model.
It is not obvious that this evidence supports a conclusion that bankruptcy asset exemptions have no e¤ect on default risk for secured loans. Credit bureau risk scores are a prediction of bankruptcy, serious delinquency, or other derogatory event, and higher asset exemptions might well in ‡uence borrowers'decisions to …le for bankruptcy, which in turn.
Pence (2003, 2006) suggested that because both real estate markets and state foreclosure and bankruptcy 1 1 Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) did not include home improvement loans in their analyses. 1 2 The di¤erence in …ndings of Lin and White and those of Berkowitz and Hynes is not due to the di¤erence in speci…cation of the homestead exemption. Lin and White found that the amount of the homestead exemption was also signi…cant and positive when speci…ed as a continuous variable. In sum, previous studies …nd that state foreclosure laws have signi…cant e¤ects on default and foreclosure rates for secured credit. These studies do not consider bankruptcy asset exemptions' possible incentive to default, however. Higher bankruptcy asset exemptions make default more attractive to the borrower and raise lenders'costs. As higher exemptions also leave borrowers with greater wealth after bankruptcy, they improve borrowers' ability to repay secured debts. Thus, the net e¤ect of bankruptcy asset exemptions is unclear. There is evidence on the e¤ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions on availability of secured credit. This evidence is inconsistent and only partially accounts for di¤erences in foreclosure laws, however. No evidence exists on bankruptcy asset exemptions' e¤ects on mortgage default and foreclosure rates. And there no currently available evidence on how bankruptcy asset exemptions or creditor remedies to default a¤ects payment performance of less risky and riskier segments of the mortgage market.
A MODEL OF BORROWING WITH BANKRUPTCY ASSET EXEMPTIONS (preliminary and incomplete)
This section presents a simple model that simultaneously considers consumers' decisions to default on their mortgages and to …le for personal bankruptcy. The model stems from the cost-bene…t analysis of Lin and White (2001). However, in our model borrowers are assumed to be risk-averse, and their decisions are driven by their preferences to hold mortgage and non-mortgage debt. 13 The key prediction of the model is that there is a non-linear relationship between bankruptcy asset exemptions, optimal holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage debt (debt portfolio), and the mortgage defaults. The empirical models which do not include debt portfolio (measured e.g. by the ratio of mortgage-debt to total consumer debt) in mortgage default equations are therefore misspeci…ed.
A. Basic Framework
The economy is represented by a consumer and a lender, which live two periods. The consumer is riskaverse and maximizes expected lifetime utility. The lender is risk-neutral and maximizes expected lifetime pro…t. In period 1, the consumer is endowed with exogenously determined non-housing wealth y 1 , which includes earned and inherited income. In the second period, the consumer earns income y 2 ; which can take values of y H if her productivity improves (for example through learning-by-doing) and y L otherwise. The consumer's productivity in period 2 is exogenously determined, with the probability of improvement equal to : The consumer's expected income in period 2 is thus given by
In period 1, the consumer buys a house of value H 1 ; …nanced by a mortgage of amount b M which is secured by the house. The consumer also takes an amount b C of unsecured personal loan. Following Lin and
White (2001), we assume that the consumer has only one unsecured loan. 14 For simplicity, we assume that the consumer does not save in period 1. 15 The lender chooses the interest rates on the mortgage and the personal loans, equal to r M and r C respectively. The lender can also choose not to lend at all. In period 2, both loans come due, so that the consumer owes b M (1 + r M ) on the mortgage loan and b C (1 + r C ) on the personal loan. The value of borrower's house in the second period, H 2 ; can take values of H H if the economy is booming and H L if the economy is in recession. The state of the economy is exogenously determined, with probability of boom equal to p: We assume that p and are independent. 16 The value of borrower's house in period 2 is thus given by
In the second period, the consumer can default on the personal loan and …le for bankruptcy, default on the mortgage, or default on both loans. If the consumer chooses to …le for bankruptcy, she is allowed to keep an exogenous amount of assets, determined by the state personal property exemption x C . Personal debt is totally or partially discharged depending on the level of gross income held in the second period. If total second period income is larger than x C , then the individual must pay the di¤erence to the creditors.
Also, the consumer must give up her house in bankruptcy if the home equity exceeds the state homestead exemption x M . Otherwise, she consumes all her assets and repays nothing. We assume that when …ling for bankruptcy the consumer incurs up-front transaction costs (e.g. fees paid to bankruptcy lawyers) equal to D. The mortgage debt is not discharged if the consumer …les for bankruptcy.
If the consumer chooses to default on the mortgage, the lender will foreclose on the house. After foreclosure, the mortgage lender sells the house for an amount H 2 to repay the mortgage loan. The remainder is used to repay personal debt, and the amount up to the homestead exemption x M is returned to the borrower.
We assume that when defaulting on mortgage the consumer incurs transaction costs R of …ling for mortgage foreclosure, which may include the legal fees and the rental costs of relocating to a new residence. Following
Lin and White (2001) we assume that the lender does not have the right to collect de…ciency judgments from the borrower, so he loses whatever portion of the mortgage not covered by the proceeds of foreclosure.
When the consumer defaults on both mortgage and personal loans, she is assumed to incur transaction costs Z: We assume that D < R < Z < D + R; because the consumer can exploit economies of scale in paying o¤ the legal costs of default on both loans.
We assume that lender's transaction costs are small if foreclosure and / or bankruptcy is initiated (e.g.
because lender handles large number of legal disputes and exploits the economies of scale), and are normalized to zero for simplicity.
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B. The Consumer's Utility Maximization Problem
We assume that the consumer's utility is additively separable across time, and is also separable within a time period for consumption and leisure, and satis…es regularity conditions:Under these assumptions the consumer's utility function can be written as
where C 1 and C 2 are consumption levels in periods 1 and 2 respectively, is the consumer's discount rate, and E is the expectations operator. In period 1 there is no uncertainty, and the value of consumption is equal to the amount of consumer's wealth and borrowed funds less the value of the house. The consumption in period 1 is thus given by
In period 2, the consumption is determined by the borrower's decision to default on the personal loan and / or the mortgage loan. When deciding whether to default, the consumer compares her consumption possibilities once second period income and housing price are realized. Four di¤erent cases need to be considered.
Case 1. The consumer chooses not to default on either the personal loan or the mortgage loan. Then, the second period consumption is 
To make things interesting, we assume that
and
Then the second period consumption is given by
Case 3. The consumer chooses to default on consumer debt, and repay the mortgage. She …les for bankruptcy, and her personal debt is discharged, but the mortgage debt is not. The amount of debt repaid in bankruptcy is determined by the homestead and personal property exemptions in the consumer's state of residence. The lender garnishes the borrower's income less the amount of state personal property exemption.
If the borrower has positive equity in the house, the lender also forecloses on the house, returns the amount up to state homestead exemption to the borrower, and uses the remainder of the balance to repay borrower's personal debt. The amount paid to the lender is thus given by
Using equations (6) and (7) in the equation (9) gives
The borrower thus gives up the portion of her second period income that exceeds state personal property exemption, and collects the amount up to state homestead exemption if she has positive equity left after the house is foreclosed by the lender. The borrower also incurs the transaction costs of …ling for bankruptcy, and pays o¤ the mortgage debt if house equity is less or equal to zero. The second period consumption is then given by returns the amount up to homestead exemption to the borrower, and collects the rest to repay the consumer debt. As before, if there is a negative balance left (H 2 b M (1 + r M ) < 0) the lender cannot obtain a de…ciency judgement and the mortgage debt is discharged. In addition, the borrower keeps the amount up to personal property exemption and pays the transaction costs of defaulting on both loans. The second period consumption in this case is given by
The comparison of the second period consumption possibilities given by the equations (5), (8), (11) , and (12) yields a set of inequalities that determine which of the four cases will happen. These inequalities are presented in Appendix I, part A. Careful analysis of these inequalities shows that some cases are mutually exclusive. Regardless of the distributions of y and H it is never optimal to have Case I and Case II, or Case III and Case IV. 18 Given that the majority of the consumers rarely default on either debt, it is interesting to consider choices between Case I and Case III, or Case I and Case IV. Below we focus on the choice between Case I and Case IV (default on neither debts or default on both debts), which is also discussed most carefully in Lin and White (2001) . Speci…cally, we consider the case when the borrower chooses not to default on either debt if y 2 = y H ; and chooses to default on both debts if y 2 = y L . The assumptions necessary to make this case valid are discussed in the Appendix I, part B. In this case the consumer's utility maximization problem becomes:
C. The Lender's Pro…t Maximization Problem
To close the model we need the lender's participation constraint which determines market equilibrium.
Lender decides what interest rate to charge on the loans, and whether to lend at all, given possibility of default. Because lender is risk-neutral, he maximizes expected pro…ts given by
where b M and b C satisfy the consumer's utility maximization problem (13) . The lender will not issue This section considers the e¤ect of a marginal increase in bankruptcy asset exemptions: homestead exemption x M ; and / or personal property exemption x C . Using the implicit function theorem, we can determine the slopes of optimal mortgage loan with respect to optimal consumer loan and vice versa (see Appendix I, part C for a proof):
The result (15) indicates that consumer and mortgage loans are the substitutes. In equilibrium, an exogenous shock leading to decline in the amount of consumer debt will result in an increase in mortgage debt and vice versa.
Now consider the e¤ect of a marginal increase in x M (the result is similar for x C ): Again, using the implicit function theorem yields (see Appendix I, part C for a proof):
The result (16) indicates that an increase in x M does not have an e¤ect on choice between the amounts of mortgage and personal loans along the optimality condition for consumer loans, and the equilibrium holdings of both mortgage and personal debt decline along the optimality condition for mortgage loans. The equilibrium condition for mortgage loans thus shifts inwards in b C : b M space (see …gure below.)
The e¤ect of x M on the choice between the mortgage and personal debt depends on the slopes of the optimality conditions for consumer and mortgage loans. What we observe in the data is likely the case of the optimality condition for consumer loans being steeper than the optimality condition for mortgage loans (see chart on the right of the …gure 1). In this case, an increase in x M lowers the optimal mortgage loan amount, and raises optimal consumer loan amount. This, in turn, changes the consumer's decision to default on her mortgage debt.
This conclusion illustrates the key result of the model. There is a non-linear relationship between bankruptcy asset exemptions, optimal holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage debt (debt portfolio), and the mortgage defaults. The empirical models which do not include debt portfolio (measured e.g. by the ratio of mortgage-debt to total consumer debt) in mortgage default equations are therefore misspeci…ed.
IV. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF MORTGAGE DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE EQUA-TIONS
As discussed above, the economic literature identi…es e¤ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions and foreclosure laws on both borrowers' and lenders' decisions. For borrowers, bankruptcy asset exemptions and state foreclosure laws a¤ect the bene…ts from defaulting on their mortgage and …ling for bankruptcy. For lenders, these legal provisions in ‡uence their willingness to lend and their willingness to initiate foreclosure procedures when borrowers default.
A. Model and Data
We estimate an empirical model to test statistically for the e¤ect of bankruptcy asset exemptions and foreclosure laws on mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. The stochastic model speci…es default or foreclosure as a function of variables a¤ecting the value of the prepayment and default options, borrower and loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions, x it ; legal environment z it 19 ; and state-speci…c …xed e¤ects i :
where " it is an error term.
We consider three measures of mortgage defaults: (1) seriously delinquent loans, (2) loan to redeem the property if he/she can repurchase the property at its sale price after it has been sold to some third-party in the foreclosure process. The borrowers are given some time period to redeem the property and this time period depends on the state in which the property is located. Statutory re-2 0 Foreclosure inventory depends not only on borrowers'and lenders'decisions to resolve defaults through pursue foreclosure but also on the speed of the foreclosure process. See Wallace (2007) for discussion. 2 1 The National Delinquency Survey (NDS) provides data on delinquency and foreclosures of residential mortgages based on a sample of more than 44 million mortgage loans serviced by mortgage companies, commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, and others. The NDS provides quarterly delinquency and foreclosure statistics at the national, regional and state levels. Delinquency and foreclosure measures are broken out into loan type (prime, subprime, VA and FHA) and …xed and adjustable rate products. At each geographic classi…cation, there are 7 measures: total delinquencies, delinquency by past due category (30-59 days, 60-89 days and 90 days and over), new foreclosures, foreclosure inventory, and seriously delinquent. The total number of loans serviced each quarter, as compiled through the survey, is also included in the data. For more on the NDS data, see Mortgage Bankers Association website: http://www.mbaa.org/. demption rights thus make foreclosure …ling very attractive to the borrowers facing temporary liquidity constraints. 
Post-bankruptcy reform indicators: We include a dummy variable indicating quarters in which the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act was in e¤ect and a dummy variable indicating that the act was in e¤ect and the state had a homestead exemption greater than $125,000.
The act limited the homestead exemption to $125,000 for consumers who live in their home less than 3 1 2 years. Because the act made bankruptcy more costly and provided less debt relief for most …lers, we expect fewer bankruptcy …lings to protect home equity and consequently higher mortgage defaults after the act became e¤ective, especially in state with relatively high homestead exemptions.
Borrower Risk and Macroeconomic Conditions
We measure borrower risk by the distribution of credit bureau scores and consumer (non-mortgage) debt to total debt. Distribution of credit bureau scores (TransUnion LLC): Credit bureau scores predict the risk of serious delinquency, bankruptcy, or other serious derogatory event using data on past debt payment behavior and credit use. As shown in previous studies (Bennett, Peach and Peristiani 2001, for example), mortgage default is lower in the states in which a higher share of borrowers have high credit scores. 22 We de…ne credit bureau score intervals that based on quartiles of the distribution of credit bureau risk scores nationally. For the prime mortgages, we constructed dummy variables indicating whether the percentage of borrowers in a state in the lowest three credit risk (highest three credit bureau score) intervals is 60 to 65 percent, 66 to 70 percent, or above 70 percent. For subprime mortgages, the dummy variables indicate whether the percentage of borrowers in the highest credit risk interval is 25 to 30 percent, 31 to 35 percent, or above 35 percent.
Non-mortgage debt as a fraction of total debt (TransUnion LLC): According to the theoretical model borrower's debt portfolio (here measured by non-mortgage debt as a fraction of total debt) is among the determinants of the mortgage default. Another reason for including this variable is that borrowers with high shares of consumer (non-mortgage) debt tend to have relatively high debt service burdens because of the short term to maturity for most consumer loans. Such borrowers are likely to be credit and liquidity constrained (Paxson 1990 ). Credit constrained borrowers are more vulnerable than other borrowers to …nancial distress caused by unexpected expenses and interruptions in income. They are less likely to be able to re…nance mortgages and more likely to …le for bankruptcy and default on their mortgage debt when they experience distress (Archer, Ling, and McGill 1996).
Variables re ‡ecting macroeconomic conditions include current mortgage interest rates, mortgage debt to home value, and unemployment. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables.
B. Estimation
The focus of this paper is to assess the e¤ects of state foreclosure laws and asset bankruptcy exemptions on mortgage defaults and foreclosure in di¤erent market segments. Therefore, we estimate the e¤ects separately for estimated for prime …xed-rate, prime adjustable-rate, subprime …xed-rate, and subprime adjustable-rate loans.
Two important econometric issues for estimating this model are the endogeneity of loan terms a¤ecting prepayment and default options and identi…cation of time-invariant state legal environment in …xed e¤ects panel data setting.
Endogeneity of Loan Terms
Mortgage default decisions and the mortgage interest rates, which a¤ect the value of the call (re…nance) option, can be simultaneously determined. An exogenous increase in mortgage defaults forces lenders to compensate for losses on foreclosed assets by raising mortgage interest rates for non-defaulting borrowers.
The rise in the interest rate, in turn, causes an additional increase in mortgage defaults. 25 Similarly, mortgage default decisions and current loan to value ratio, which a¤ects the value of put (default) option, can be simultaneously determined. Borrowers consider the risk of default in choosing credit terms. When borrowers choose to …nance a larger percentage of house value at a higher interest rate, they are aware that the higher debt service burden and smaller equity stake in the house a¤ects their ability and willingness to repay the mortgage. 26 Thus, the loan-to-value ratio and interest rate are not econometrically exogenous in explaining default and possible foreclosure.
Identi…cation of Time-Invariant Variables
Second, econometric identi…cation of time-invariant variables in panel data model with unobserved state random e¤ects is di¢ cult. If unobserved state random e¤ects are correlated with some explanatory variables, random-e¤ects model will produce inconsistent estimates, and the …xed-e¤ects model eliminates timeinvariant variables (Wooldridge, 2002) .
Implementation
We address the econometric complications by estimating our model in two steps. In the …rst step, we regress mortgage interest rates or loan to value ratio on a set of instruments that shift credit demand or supply and are uncorrelated with ex-ante mortgage default decisions. We use the following set of instruments:
Lagged values of mortgage interest rates or loan to value ratio. For the mortgage interest rate, we use the lagged value of mortgage interest rate, prime rate, age distribution dummies, and net tightening as instruments. For loan to value, we use the lagged value of loan to value, prime rate, age distribution dummies, net tightening, and state income per capita as instruments.
In the second stage, we use the predicted values of mortgage interest rates and loan-to-value ratios as explanatory variables and estimate equation (1) 
E¤ ects of Borrower Risk and Macroeconomic Conditions
The estimated e¤ects of borrower risk and macroeconomic conditions on default and foreclosure are generally statistically signi…cant at conventional levels and consistent with theory and …ndings of previous studies.
Results are similar for serious delinquency and foreclosure starts, except that the size of the coe¢ cients for serious delinquency is much larger in absolute value than the size of coe¢ cients for foreclosures. The signs of coe¢ cients for these variables are the same for each type of interest rate in both prime and subprime markets. The coe¢ cients for the dummy variables re ‡ecting credit bureau score distributions increase in size as the percentage of higher risk borrowers increases, which indicates that higher risk populations have signi…cantly higher rates of serious delinquency and foreclosure. Consistent with the prediction of theoretical model, higher levels of non-mortgage debt to total debt in are generally positively and signi…cantly related to default and foreclosure. And both serious delinquencies and foreclosures are higher in states with higher unemployment rates.
The estimated e¤ects of the current mortgage interest rate and loan-to-value ratio are consistent with expectations. As mentioned earlier in this paper, higher interest rates lower the value of mortgage re…nance option, making default less costly to borrowers. Higher interest rates also may make default on high-risk mortgages more attractive to lenders when the current interest rate is greater than the contract rate. We …nd that higher interest rates are signi…cantly positively related to serious delinquencies and foreclosures in all but one model. Higher current loan-to-value ratios are associated with signi…cantly greater serious delinquencies and foreclosures in all models.
For prime FRM and ARM loans, the ratio of foreclosure starts to seriously delinquent loans is higher in states with greater percentages of risky borrowers. For subprime loans, the ratio of foreclosure starts is largely not related to the percentage of risky borrowers. Foreclosure starts to serious delinquencies are not generally signi…cantly related to the ratio of non-mortgage debt to total debt. However, for the riskiest category of mortgages, subprime ARMs, relatively high levels of non-mortgage debt is inversely related to the ratio of foreclosures to serious delinquencies. The unemployment rate is inversely related to the share of foreclosure start-ups as a fraction of seriously delinquent loans in all models.
The interest rate is negatively related to the ratio of foreclosures to serious delinquencies for …xed-rate prime mortgages. For adjustable rate-prime and both types of subprime mortgages, however, the interest rate is positively related to foreclosures to serious delinquencies. The ratio of foreclosures to seriously delinquent mortgages is lower in the states where average current loan-to-value ratio is higher.
State Foreclosure Laws
Foreclosures and serious delinquencies are higher in states that require judicial foreclosure than in states that allow non-judicial foreclosures. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the delay associated with judicial foreclosure provides borrowers with an incentive to force lenders to initiate foreclosure proceedings as a remedy to default. Despite the higher incidence of foreclosures, the ratio of foreclosures to serious delinquencies is smaller in states that require judicial foreclosure than in states that allow non-judicial
foreclosures. This result may re ‡ect lenders'incentive to resolve defaults outside of foreclosure when judicial foreclosures are required.
Prohibition of de…ciency judgement is positively related to serious delinquency and foreclosure. However, the standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients for this variable are relatively large, perhaps in part because the provisions of the laws regarding de…ciency judgements are quite heterogeneous. Consequently, the positive coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. Prohibition of de…ciency judgement is associated with fewer foreclosures relative to serious delinquencies, although the relationship is generally small and not statistically signi…cant.
States that provide a statutory right of redemption generally had fewer serious delinquencies and foreclosures, but the e¤ect of these provisions is small (in absolute value) and not statistically signi…cant. A statutory right of redemption is inversely related to the fraction of foreclosures to serious delinquencies.
Again, the e¤ect is small and not signi…cant.
Bankruptcy Asset Exemptions
Both personal property and homestead exemptions are statistically signi…cant in most of the estimated speci…cations. Estimated coe¢ cients for normalized personal property exemptions are negative and sig-ni…cant in the regressions for prime and subprime serious delinquencies and subprime foreclosures. The coe¢ cient for prime …xed-rate mortgage foreclosure starts is positive but not statistically signi…cantly different from zero. Estimated coe¢ cients for normalized property exemptions are statistically signi…cant and negative in the regressions for the ratio of foreclosure starts to seriously delinquent loans subprime but not prime mortgages. These …ndings provide strong support for Berkowitz and Hynes' (1999) hypothesis that by discharging non-mortgage debts, personal property exemptions may help borrowers make payments on secured debts and avoid default and foreclosure. Contrary to expectations, serious delinquencies and foreclosures of subprime FRM loans were lower after bankruptcy reform. An explanation for this result is not obvious, but it is worth noting that the subprime market is not homogeneous. Subprime FRM borrowers tend to have higher FICO risk scores, lower valued properties, and lower incomes than subprime ARM borrowers (Elliehausen, Hwang, and Park 2008). As a goal of bankruptcy reform was to reduce the availability of bankruptcy relief for higher income and higher asset debtors, the act may have a¤ected subprime FRM borrowers in a more limited way.
We did not …nd strong evidence that foreclosure starts increased more in states with homestead exemptions greater than the bankruptcy reform act's $125,000 limit than in states with lower limits. Foreclosure starts for both prime and subprime ARM foreclosures were greater in high-exemption states than is lower exemption states. That the e¤ect of the $125,000 limit is signi…cant in the ARM but not FRM segment may be a consequence of ARMs greater risk.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the e¤ects of foreclosure laws and bankruptcy asset exemptions on mortgage default and foreclosure rates. Theoretical considerations suggest that bankruptcy asset exemptions should matter, but predicted e¤ects could either increase or reduce foreclosures. Higher exemption levels leave borrower with greater wealth after bankruptcy to pay secured debts and therefore make bankruptcy less costly for the borrower. Although a mortgage must be paid in full before a before the borrower bene…ts from the bankruptcy homestead exemption, …ling for bankruptcy invokes an automatic stay on lender e¤orts to collect the debt, which increases the time between delinquency and foreclosure. The delay resulting from a bankruptcy …ling may make foreclosure attractive to a borrower and induce them to force lenders to foreclose to resolve delinquency. Lenders, on the other hand, may be more receptive to resolving a default outside of foreclosure.
These laws are important because they may a¤ect whether or not some consumers are able to obtain mortgages. They also may a¤ect whether or not borrowers who experience payment problems ultimately are able to remain in the house. Cutts and Merrill (2008) found that very short and very long foreclosure processes are associated with relatively high home loss rates, for example. Thus, laws that greatly delay resolution of defaults or induce borrowers to take actions that greatly delay resolution may harm borrowers that the laws seek to protect.
We …nd evidence that foreclosure laws that raise the cost of foreclosure result in greater foreclosures.
Foreclosures are higher in states that require judicial foreclosure and prohibit de…ciency judgements, although prohibition of de…ciency judgements is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. These …ndings suggest that costly foreclosure laws induce borrowers to force lenders to foreclose to resolve default. However, we also …nd that costly foreclosure results in lower foreclosures to serious delinquency, which suggests that lenders attempt to resolve default outside default. The e¤ects of foreclosure laws are similar in both prime and subprime markets.
E¤ects of bankruptcy asset exemptions di¤er in prime and subprime markets. We …nd that higher personal property exemptions reduce foreclosures for subprime but not prime mortgages. This negative e¤ect is consistent with Berkowitz and Hynes' (1999) prediction that greater wealth after completion of bankruptcy may help borrowers repay secured debts. Thus, subprime borrowers, who are likely to be liquidity constrained, use wealth increase to repay secured lenders rather than delay foreclosure to stay in house.
High homestead exemptions are associated with greater foreclosures for prime and subprime ARMs, (consistent with Lin and White) using delay in foreclosure to stay in the house. High homestead exemptions are associated with fewer foreclosures for subprime FRMs, (consistent with Berkowitz and Hynes) using increase in wealth to repay secured creditors. We …nd that high exemptions and relatively higher non-mortgage debt are associated with signi…cantly higher foreclosure starts for prime mortgages, which con…rms our hypothesis that debt portfolio matters in explaining the e¤ect of bankruptcy asset exemptions on mortgage default and foreclosure rates. It also seems that the e¤ect of homestead exemptions depends on the circumstances of the borrower. ARM borrowers use ARM to a¤ord larger mortgage and appear to use bankruptcy to prolong staying in the house. In contrast, subprime FRM borrowers typically have impaired credit histories and often re…nance mortgages to consolidate debts and reduce debt servicing costs.
Finally, bankruptcy reform increased foreclosures for subprime ARM and prime borrowers, consistent with higher bankruptcy costs discouraging …ling for bankruptcy to delay foreclosure to stay in the house.
Again, we …nd di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent market segments. Subprime FRM borrowers'lower incomes and house values suggests that they were less likely than subprime ARM or prime borrowers to be a¤ected by bankruptcy reform law's exemption or income limits.
APPENDIX I: A MODEL OF BORROWING WITH BANKRUPTCY ASSET EXEMPTIONS -ADDI-TIONAL RESULTS
A. Cost -Bene…t Analysis
The consumer's decision whether to default on either or both of the loans is determined by the second period consumption possibilities given by the equations (5), (8), (11), and (12).
Case 1. It is optimal not to default on either debts when C 
Case 2. It is optimal to default on the mortgage debt when C 
Case 3. It is optimal to default on the personal debt when C 
Case 4. It is optimal to default on both debts when C 
B. Default Decisions under Income Uncertainty
Proposition 1
The borrower chooses not to default on either debts when y 2 = y H ; and to default on both debts when y 2 = y L if the following inequalities are satis…ed:
Proof. To prove the proposition we need to show that cases 2 and 3 do not hold, and the inequalities (19) and (20) are satis…ed if y 2 = y H ; and the inequalities (28) and (29) are satis…ed if y 2 = y L : The inequalities (30) and (31) are identical to inequalities (18) and (27), so we do not need to prove that these inequalities hold. Cases 2 and 3 never hold because inequalities (30) and (21), and inequalities (31) and (24) are mutually exclusive. If y 2 = y H then the inequality (32) becomes the inequality (19) . Subtracting (20) from (19) gives: (34) ). So inequality (20) holds when inequality (19) holds. This eliminates case 4 (inequalities (20) and (29) are mutually exclusive). So, if y 2 = y H then only case 1 is feasible. If y 2 = y L then the inequality (33) becomes the inequality (29), so case 1 does not hold (inequalities (20) and (29) are mutually exclusive). Subtracting (28) from (29) gives: (34) , and because R > Z D). So inequality (28) holds when inequality (29) holds.
C. Derivation of the E¤ ect of a Marginal Increase in the Bankruptcy Asset Exemptions
The …rst order conditions for the consumer's maximization problem (13) are:
Using the implicit function theorem, we could determine the slopes of optimal mortgage loan with respect to optimal consumer loan and vice versa:
Now consider the e¤ect of a marginal increase in x M (x C ): Again, using the implicit function theorem yields:
APPENDIX II: EMPIRICAL RESULTS Note: *** , ** , and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: *** , ** , and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: *** , ** , and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: *** , ** , and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
